版权说明 操作指南
首页 > 成果 > 详情

Highway toll allocation

认领
导出
Link by DOI
反馈
分享
QQ微信 微博
成果类型:
期刊论文
作者:
Wu, Hao;van den Brink, Rene;Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza
通讯作者:
Wu, H
作者机构:
[Wu, H; Wu, Hao] Guangxi Univ, Sch Econ, Nanning 530004, Peoples R China.
[Wu, H; Wu, Hao] Changsha Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Changsha 410076, Peoples R China.
[Wu, H; Wu, Hao] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Dept Econ, Boelelaan 1105, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands.
[Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Dept Operat Analyt, Boelelaan 1105, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands.
通讯机构:
[Wu, H ] G
Guangxi Univ, Sch Econ, Nanning 530004, Peoples R China.
Changsha Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Changsha 410076, Peoples R China.
Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Dept Econ, Boelelaan 1105, NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands.
语种:
英文
关键词:
Highway toll allocation problem;Axiomatic characterization;Shapley value
期刊:
Transportation Research Part B-Methodological
ISSN:
0191-2615
年:
2024
卷:
180
页码:
102889
基金类别:
China Scholarship Council [201906130073]
机构署名:
本校为通讯机构
院系归属:
经济与管理学院
摘要:
An important operational aspect in the management of tolled highways is how the collected tolls should be allocated over the different highway segments, either operated by different operators or by different units of one operator. This paper analyzes this toll allocation problem both from an axiomatic and a game theoretic perspective. Based on different toll charging systems, specifically the distance-based toll system and the fixed toll system, we propose three allocation or sharing methods: the Segments Equal Sharing method, the Exits Equal Sharing method, and the Entrances Equal Sharing met...

反馈

验证码:
看不清楚,换一个
确定
取消

成果认领

标题:
用户 作者 通讯作者
请选择
请选择
确定
取消

提示

该栏目需要登录且有访问权限才可以访问

如果您有访问权限,请直接 登录访问

如果您没有访问权限,请联系管理员申请开通

管理员联系邮箱:yun@hnwdkj.com