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Optimal decisions for a dual-channel supply chain under information asymmetry

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成果类型:
期刊论文
作者:
Lai, Mingyong;Yang, Hongzhao;Cao, Erbao*;Qiu, Duo;Qiu, Jing
通讯作者:
Cao, Erbao
作者机构:
[Yang, Hongzhao; Lai, Mingyong] Changsha Univ Sci & Technol, Coll Econ & Management, Hunan Prov Engn Res Ctr Elect Transportat & Smart, Changsha 410114, Hunan, Peoples R China.
[Cao, Erbao; Qiu, Duo] Hunan Univ, Coll Econ & Trade, Hunan Prov Key Lab Logist Informat & Simulat Tech, Changsha 410079, Hunan, Peoples R China.
[Qiu, Jing] CSIRO, Energy Ctr, Mayfield West, NSW 2304, Australia.
通讯机构:
[Cao, Erbao] H
Hunan Univ, Coll Econ & Trade, Hunan Prov Key Lab Logist Informat & Simulat Tech, Changsha 410079, Hunan, Peoples R China.
语种:
英文
关键词:
Direct and indirect channel;price competition;information asymmetry;information value;game theory
期刊:
JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL AND MANAGEMENT OPTIMIZATION
ISSN:
1547-5816
年:
2018
卷:
14
期:
3
页码:
1023-1040
基金类别:
This research was supported by: (i) the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 71420107027, 71671061, 71331001 and 91547113; (ii) the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University under Grants NCET-13-0181; (iii) the Science and Technology Projects of Hunan Province under Grants 2016WK2015 and 2017CT5015
机构署名:
本校为第一机构
院系归属:
电气与信息工程学院
经济与管理学院
摘要:
We discuss the optimal pricing and production decisions in a channel supply chain under symmetric and asymmetric information cases. We compare the optimum policies between the asymmetric information and the full information cases. We analyze the effect of the reseller's cost information on the profits of the partners. We find that information asymmetry is beneficial to the reseller, but is inefficient to the manufacturer and the whole supply chain. The information value increases with uncertainties arising from the reseller's cost structure. The dual-channel supply chain can share information ...

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